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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
I. LIQUoR REGULATioN
In Pirates' Cove, Inc. v. Strom,1 another effort was made to
untie South Carolina's Gordian knot of liquor laws. As expected,
the attempt failed. The issue, as defined by the court, was
"whether one may lawfully sell legally acquired alcoholic liquors
in South Carolina, or have the same in possession for sale,
without a license from the State to do so." 2
The, plaintiffs' argument was a three-step process beginning
with State v. 3e1faster.3 There the South Carolina Supreme
Court found that when a purely private club furnished liquor,
paid for out of the general club funds, to its members, no sale
was consumated. In 1907 a statute- was passed which voided
the MeMaster decision. This statute was carried over in sub-
stance in the South Carolina Code5 until 1956 when it was re-
pealed.6 The plaintiffs, in essence, maintained that by repealing
the 1907 statute the McMaster ruling was reinstated. The court
felt this claim did not warrant discussion because South Caro-
lina Code Section 4-917 was broad enough to prohibit plaintiffs'
activities." Also, the court distinguished this case from the
Mcnlaster case by ruling that whereas in the latter situation
there was no sale and no profit, in this case a sale by the
Pirates' Cove to its members resulted in a profit.9
1. 249 S.C. 270, 153 S.E.2d 900 (1967).
2. Id. at 274, 153 S.E2d at 901.
3. 35 S.C. 1, 14 S.E. 290 (1892).
4. XXV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 463, 474 (No. 226, 1907). The applicable
portion reads:
It shall be unlawful for any club, company, association or corporaiton, or
any chartered company now in existence, or hereafter to be incorporated,
for social, literary, or other purpose, within this State, to buy, sell, keep
for sale, exchange, barter, any liquor ... for any purpose whatever,
either to members or to other persons ....
5. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-97 (1952).
6. XLIX S.C. STATS. AT LAGE 1992, 2007 (No. 820, 1956).
7. S.C. CODE ANN. § 4-91 (1962) reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture, store, keep, receive,
have in possession, transport, ship, buy, sell, barter, exchange or deliver
any alcoholic liquors except liquors acquired in a legal manner, and ex-
cept in accordance with the provisions of this chapter (emphasis added).
8. Pirates Cove, Inc. v. Strom, 249 S.C. 270, 275, 153 S.E.2d 900, 903
(1967).
9. Id.
1
Sullivan: Constitutional Law
Published by Scholar Commons, 1967
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw SuRvETYED
A. "Ho Ho Ho He He He Little Brown 'Bag' How I Love
Thee."' 0
The above ditty may have been sung by a happy "wet" upon
the enactment of the "Brown Bagging" law."- The primary
change wrought by this law affects the kinds of places a person
may lawfully possess and consume alcoholic liquors. Although
the state's constitutional prohibition of sales by the drink re-
mains in force, the law does permit a person to carry his own
legally acquired liquor into various licensed establishments and
purchase setups with which to mix his drinks.
The "brown bagging" law seems to effect a temporary com-
promise between the "wets" and "drys" in the state. However,
when two strong groups square off in seeking an opposite result,
change is inevitable. Although momentarily subdued, it is
doubtful if the liquor struggle is over in South Carolina.12
10. Sung to the tune of "Little Brown Jug."
11. LV S.C. STATS AT LARGE 571 (No. 398, 1967). The key section of this
statute is section 10 which, in part, reads:
Section 10. When lawful to possess alcoholic liquors ....
A. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, it shall be lawful, subject
to the provisions of subsection B of this section, for any person who is at
least twenty-one years of age to transport, possess or consume lawfully
acquired alcoholic liquors in accordance with the following: ....
(2) Any person may possess or consume alcoholic liquors:
(a) in a private residence, hotel room or motel room;
(b) or on any other private property not primarily engaged at that
time in commercial entertainment and not open to the general public at
the time when such person has obtained the express permission of the
owner or person lawfully in possession of the property; provided, how-
ever, this shall not be construed to permit or in any way authorize the
possession or consumption of alcoholic liquors on premises for which a
permit is required pursuant to items (3) and (4) of this subsection.
(3) Any member, or guest of a member, of a nonprofit organization with
limited membership established for social, benevolent, patriotic, recrea-
tional or fraternal purposes may possess or consume alcoholic liquors on
premises operated by such organization and not open to the general pub-
lic, provided a permit has been issued to the organization for such
premises by the Alcoholic Beverage Control Commission.
(4) It shall be lawful for any person to possess or consume alcoholic
liquors on the premises of any business establishment, except on Sunday,
provided the establishment meets the following requirements:
(a) The business is bona fide engaged primarily and substantially in
the preparation and serving of meals or furnishing of lodging; and
(b) The business has a permit ....
B. It shall be unlawful for any person to possess or consume any alco-
holic liquors upon any premises where such person has been forbidden to
possess or consume alcoholic liquors by the owner, operator or person in
charge of the premises.
12. For a review of liquor regulation in the state, see Hibbard, A History of
South Carolina Liquor Regulation, 19 S.C.L. RE. 157 (1967).
1967]
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II. "'RE-R EAPPORTION3m-NT"
The case of State exi rel. MeLeod v. West' s declared that the
1966 fifty-member senate reapportionment plan' 4 was invalid
in that it violated the state's constitution.'
5
Since the United States Supreme Court in ReynoZds v. Si m 6
held that both houses of a state's bicameral legislature must be
apportioned on a population basis in order to fulfill the equal
protection requirement of the fourteenth amendment, practically
every state except one' 7 has had to shuffle senators and sena-
torial districts into an acceptable pattern. O'Sields v. MeNairs'8
was the signal which marked South Carolina's entry into the
race to redistrict.
By interpretative legerdemain, our court has managed to save
a constitutional clause but in the process condemn a senate. The
senate's death knell was sounded in the West decision wherein
the court read one sentence in our constitution as having two
meanings and then declared one meaning valid and the other
invalid. Referring to article 3 section 6 of the South Carolina
Constitution, the court stated:
This pithy section was skillfully drafted to accomplish
two relevant objectives, i.e., to fix the numerical composition
of the Senate as equivalent to the number of counties and
to apportion the members on the basis of one senator from
each country. The second of these objectives has been
stricken for conflict with federal law. The first is not sub-
ject to challenge on this ground, and is valid unless it must
fall with the second. The issue turns on whether the valid
is severable from the invalid without perversion of its
meaning.'
9
The court went on to hold that the meanings were severable and
that the valid portion required South Carolina's senate to be
13. 249 S.C. 243, 153 S.E.2d 892 (1967).
14. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2016 (No. 743, 1966).
15. S.C. CONsT. art. 3, § 6 provides:
The Senate shall be composed of one member from each County, to be
elected for the term of four years ....
16. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
17. Nebraska has a unicameral legislature.
18. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708 (D.S.C. 1966).
19. State ex re. McLeod v. West, 249 S.C. 243, 246, 153 S.E2d 892, 893
(1967).
[Vol. 19
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composed of neither more nor less than 46 members, at the
present time.20
The court in this decision relied on the New York case of In
re Orans21 involving a similar question in that the court was
ruling on the constitutionality of a plan that would have in-
creased the New York assembly over the one hundred and fifty
members as required by that state's constitution. However, the
section there in question specifically states that the assembly
shall consist of one hundred and fifty members. 22 In other
words, the New York case involved one section with one mean-
ing, not one section with two meanings. Our court resolved this
difference by saying of our section, "the difference is in form
only, and the issue of severability is to be resolved upon sub-
stance."23
There is authority by which our court could have decided the
-West case differently. In In re Advisory Opinion to the Gov-
erno24 the same question of whether the state constitution2 5
limited the size of the legislature was presented. The Florida
court found that the two federal court decisions2" which declared
Florida's apportionment unconstitutional also rendered invalid
the size requirement of the legislature. Our court dispensed
with this case by saying that it
is not persuasive because the court simply construed a fed-
eral court judgment as having 'eliminated the limitations
provided in the Florida Constitution on the size of the
House and Senate,' without considering whether such limi-
tations were severable from the apportionment provisions.21
20. On April 10, 1967, in response to a motion for a rehearing of this case,
the court ruled that the fifty-man senate was a valid legislative body until the
1968 election. The court based its decision on the right of the state citizens to
representation and said to deprive them of that right would run against an
essential concept of the South Carolina Constitution. State ex tel McLeod v.
West, 249 S.C. 243, 248, 153 S.E2d 892, 894 (1966).
21. 15 N.Y2d 339, 258 N.Y.S. 825, 206 N.E.2d 854 (1965).
22. N.Y. CoNsT. art. 3, § 2.
23. State ex tel. McLeod v. West, 249 S.C. 243, 247, 153 S.E2d 892, 894
(1967).
24. 150 So. 2d 271 (Fla. 1963).
25. FA. CoST. art. 7, § 3. The pertinent part reads: "The legislature ...
shall apportion the Representation in the Senate, and shall provide for thirty-
eight (38) Senatorial Districts ... and each shall have one Senator."
26. Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962).
27. State ex tel. McLeod v. West, 249 S.C. 243, 248, 153 S.E2d 892, 894
(1967).
1967]
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As a result of the lWest decision, which could have been de-
cided either way, our court has seen fit to leave a change in the
senate's size to the people via a constitutional amendment. For
reasons hereinafter stated, no logical choice remains but to
amend this section of our constitution. Indeed, the court in
O'Shields seems to have anticipated this and recommended such
a procedure.
28
The first reason such a course is advisable lies in other sections
of the state constitution relating to the formation of new coun-
ties. Factually speaking, our constitution does not require a
forty-six member senate but rather requires a senator from each
county.2" It just happens that presently we have forty-six coun-
ties. The basic requirement for forming a new county as set out
in the state constitution is:
The General Assembly may establish new Counties in the
following manner: Whenever one-third of the qualified
electors within the area of each section of an old County
proposed to be cut off to form a new County shall petition
the Governor for the creation of a new County, setting forth
the boundaries and showing compliance with the require-
ments of this Article, the Governor shall order an election,
within a reasonable time thereafter, by the qualified electors
within the proposed area, in which election they shall vote
"Yes" or "No" upon the question of creating said new
County; and at the same election the question of a name
and a County seat for such County shall be submitted to
the electors.30
The problem thus presented is as follows: the senate could be
properly apportioned using the present number of forty-six. If
28. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 711 (D.S.C. 1966).
29. S.C. CONST. art. 3, § 6.
30. S.C. CONST. art. 7, § 1. The other sections of this article relating to the
formation of new counties are:
§ 2. Requiring that if two-thirds vote 'yes' in the election, the General As-
sembly shall at the next session establish the new county.
§ 3. Requirements as to population-not less than one one-hundred and
twenty-fourth parts of the total population of the state. As to taxable prop-
erty-not less than one and one half million dollars. As to area-not less than
four hundred square miles.
§ 4. As to the old county. It shall not be reduced to less than five hundred
square miles and shall not be reduced in taxable property to less than two mil-
lion dollars nor have less than fifteen thousand inhabitants.
§ 5. The new county line cannot be within eight miles of the old county's
court house.
§ 14. No county line shall pass through any incorporated city or town.
5
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a new county were formed, the number of persons represented
by each of the forty-six senators could still be proper, but then
the constitution would require forty-seven senators and the sen-
ate would be invalid again. Although this situation may not
seem probable to many, how many thought that the South Caro-
lina senate would have to be reapportioned according to popula-
tion? Indeed, since the present constitution was adopted in 1895
ten new counties have been formed. 1
A second reason a constitutional amendment is advisable is
the growth patterns of the state. The more industrialized areas
of the state are gaining in population much more rapidly than
the rural areas. It is not inconceivable that in the future, if the
senate's size remains fixed at forty-six, as many as four or five
rural counties would have one senator to represent all of them.
Such an arrangement may satisfy the federal requirement as to
population, but it is easy to imagine the difficulties one person
would have in adequately representing so large a geographical
area.
As to what senate size a state deems best suited for its legis-
lature, the Court in Reynolds v. Sims"2 stated:
Determining the size of its legislative bodies is of course
a matter within the discretion of each individual state.
Nothing in this opinion should be read as indicating that
there are any federal constitutional maximums or minimums
on the size of state legislative bodies.83
Although the size of state legislative bodies is left to the
states, the method of apportionment is very much a federal
concern and it is only hoped that South Carolina can formulate
an acceptable plan before the federal court undertakes the task
itself.84
III. Own, RIGHTs
In the cases of Williams v. Sumter School District Num 7er 235
and Rackiey v. School District Number 5 of Orangeburg,86 sub-
31. O'Shields v. McNair, 254 F. Supp. 708, 716 (D.S.C. 1966).
32. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
33. Id. at 581 n.63.
34. For recent articles pertaining to reapportionment in South Carolina see
18 S.C.L. Rzv. 886 (1966) and 19 S.C.L. REv. 6 (1967).
35. 255 F. Supp. 397 (D.S.C. 1966).
36. 258 F. Supp. 676 (D.S.C. 1966). The plaintiff in this case was also the
plaintiff in the case which led to the de-segregation of the Orangeburg Hospital.
See Rackley v. Board of Trustees, 238 F. Supp. 512 (D.S.C. 1965).
19671
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stantially the same question was involved. In both cases, the
plaintiff-teachers' contracts were not renewed, as the court ruled,
by reason of their civil rights activities.
The qualifications of the plaintiffs and their classroom con-
duct were above reproach and termed excellent. 7 However,
both were extremely active in civil rights activities within their
respective communities.
Ruling in the TWillianm case the court stated:
The action of the Sumter Board was, is, arbitrary, capri-
cious, without constitutional foundation, and beyond consti-
tutional authority. It is obvious that plaintiff was refused,
denied, reemployment because of her civil rights activity. 3
The court, while recognizing the powers of school administrators
in this area, stated in Rackley:
This court is loathe to interfere or override any actions of
a public administrative body in the exercise of its discre-
tionary powers and functions except in the clearest of
cases.80
The court went on to describe the school board's action as
follows:
The court concludes that the board's action was based upon
the exercise by plaintiff of her constitutionally protected
rights and privileges. Her discharge by the board and its
failure to rehire her were based upon improper, illegal and
constitutionally proscribed considerations, which resulted in
an unwarranted and discriminatory exercise of its discre-
tionary powers.
40
The court had ample authority for its decisions. Both cases
cited the North Carolina case of Jomonv . Branoh.4 1 This case
involved the same factual pattern as the two cases now under
discussion. The same decision was reached.
The Supreme Court has not been silent in regard to the in-
volvement of teachers in controversial activities. In the 1967
37. As to comments about their respective qualifications see Rackley v.
School Dist. No. 5, 258 F. Supp. 676, 679 n2 (D.S.C. 1966) and Williams v.
Sumter School Dist. No. 2, 255 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D.S.C. 1966).
38. Williams v. Sumter School Dist. No. 2, 255 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D.S.C.
1966).
39. Rackley v. School Dist. No. 5, 258 F. Supp. 676, 684-85 (D.S.C. 1966).
40. Id. at 685.
41. 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir. 1966).
[Vol. 19
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case of Keyishian v. Board of Regents,42 the Supreme Court held
certain sections of the New York loyality program to be uncon-
stitutional. In so doing, the Court ruled that members of the
Communist party who did not share its unlawful aims and did
not have the specific intent to overthrow the government by
force or violence could not be barred from teaching in the public
school system.
As a result of the Heyishan case the question as to the two
teachers here involved may be answered as follows, If a Com-
munist can teach in a public school system, surely a civil rights
leader has the same privilege.
43
IV. EIEOrIoNS
The case of State ex rel. Thomnton v. Wannakmaer44 presented
the question of whether or not the defendant had a right to have
his name printed as a nominee on the official ballot for the
1966 general election as a candidate by petition for the office
of State Treasurer.
The question came up by reason of the death of the Demo-
cratic Party's nominee, Mr. Jeff Bates, in August of 1966, and
the resulting vacancy in the office of State Treasurer. The
office was filled by appointment under state law45 and the
Democratic Party chose another nominee. The propriety of this
procedure was not questioned. Mr. Wannamaker's name was
submitted by petition to the Secretary of State on September 8,
1966. The court held that the filing of the petition was not
timely and that defendant was not entitled to have his name
printed on The ballot.
The defendant made a two-pronged argument which was dis-
patched by the court with little effort. First he attacked the
constitutionality of the applicable election law amendment of
1964. The court answered by noting that even if the amendment
42. 87 S. Ct. 695 (1967). This case is discussed in 19 S.C.L. REv. 422 (1967).
43. The general power to discharge a teacher in South Carolina is found in
S.C. CoDE ANN. § 21-230 (1962) which reads as follows:
General powers and duties of school trustees-
The board of trustees shall also: . . .
(2) Employ and discharge teachers. Employ teachers ... and discharge
them when good and sufficient reasons for so doing present themselves;
subject to the supervision of the county board of education...
44. 248 S.C. 421, 150 S.E.2d 607 (1966).
45. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2, 1-222 (1962). The latest changes in the election
laws can be found in LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2340, (No. 971, 1966).
1967]
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were not valid the petition would have been late under the law
as it stood prior to the amendment.4"
The second argument was that the election was one to fill a
vacancy in the office, whereas the statute related to an election
to fill a term of office.47 The court retorted as follows:
The method of filling an unexpired term in the office of
State Treasurer is prescribed by Sections 1-2 and 1-222 of
the 1962 Code of Laws, which, when properly construed
together, clearly authorize the Governor to appoint until the
meeting of the next General Assembly, at which time the
General Assembly would elect a State Treasurer to serve
the remainder of the unexpired term. Upon the death of
Mr. Bates on August 17, 1966, the Governor made an
appointment ....
There is therefore no vacancy in the office of State
Treasurer to be filled at the General Election .... Instead,
the election is one to fill the next term . . . to which the
election statutes clearly apply.48
Upon an examination of the case and the statutes involved one
can readily see that the court was correct in its decision.
V. CONrIcs
Locklair v. Locklair49 involved the question of whether a
South Carolina wife could sue her husband, also a state resident,
for injuries sustained in an automobile accident in Georgia.
The facts in this case are similar to those in 1964 case of
Oshiek v. Oshiek 0 in which our court followed the traditional
conflicts theory of lex loci delicti. In the Oshie case Georgia
law was held to apply, and, since that state still follows the
doctrine of inter-spousal tort immunity,r" recovery was denied.
Cognizant of her husband's immunity, the plaintiff-wife in
Looklair brought suit in the federal courts alleging that to dis-
allow her suit would be a denial of equal protection under the
46. State ex rel. Thornton v. Wannamaker, 248 S.C. 421, 428, 150 S.E.2d 607,
610 (1966).
47. Id. at 428, 150 S.E.2d at 610.
48. State ex rel. Thornton v. Wannamaker, 248 S.C. 421, 429, 150 S.E.2d
607, 610 (1966).
49. 256 F. Supp. 530 (D.S.C. 1966).
50. 244 S.C. 249, 136 S.E.2d 303 (1964).
51. GA. CODE Amr. § 53-501 (1961).
[Vol. 19
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Federal Constitution. The court answered this novel claim by
stating:
Moreover, there is no discrimination nor denial of equal
protection of the laws insofar as plaintiff is concerned, inas-
much as the Georgia law applies equally to husbands as well
as to wives. If a wife negligently or recklessly injures her
husband, he likewise has no cause of action against her
under the Georgia decisions. Eddleman v. Eddleman, 183
Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937).52
The court, in effect, said in this decision that South Carolina
has chosen to retain the lex loci delicti rule and the federal
court is bound by that choice.53
VI. MILK REGuL&TiON
In the case of Richbourg's Shoppers Fair, Inc. v. Stone54 the
South Carolina Supreme Court followed its prior decisionsP5 in
this field and ruled the 1965 milk pricing scheme56 unconsti-
tutional.
This case and a history of milk regulation in South Carolina
is the subject of an extensive note recently published in the
South Carolina Law Review.57 As pointed out in that article,
although the 1965 statute was declared unconstitutional, South
Carolina still has milk price fixing at all levels by reason of the
yet unchallenged 1966 act.55 This statute was originally to last
for a maximum period of only 380 days but was recently ex-
tended 9 to remain effective until June 1, 1968. The question is
whether the court will declare this law unconstitutional when
and if it is challenged.
The legislature, in drafting the 1966 law, has attempted to
analyze the court's reasons for declaring the earlier acts uncon-
52. Locldair v. Locklair, 256 F. Supp. 530, 533 (D.S.C. 1966).
53. Id. For discussion of the Oshiek case, ree 17 S.C.L. REv. 305 (1965).
For other articles concerning this problem in South Carolina see 18 S.C.L. REv.
453 (1966) and 18 S.C.L. REV. 880 (1966).
54. 249 S.C. 278, 153 S.E2d 895 (1967).
55. The court also held milk price fixing schemes unconstitutional in Gwyn-
ette v. Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 115 S.E.2d 673 (1960) and Stone v. Salley, 244
S.C. 531, 137 S.E2d 788 (1964).
56. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 528 (No. 297, 1965).
57. 19 S.C.L. REv. 389 (1967).
58. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2847 (No. 1165, 1966).
59. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1173 (No. 614, 1967).
1967]
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stitutional and counter them in the preface of the 1966 act. (The
preface is two pages in length whereas the act itself is only a
page and a half.) The following facts and statements are found
in those introductory remarks: that the public health and wel-
fare is being endangered as a result of the price war which has
forced 268 dairy farmers out of business since 1963; that the
supply of fresh milk is being threatened by these practices and
as a result the public health is being seriously endangered; that
ninety percent of the milk sold in the free world is subject to
some form of economic control; that milk is now affected with
the public interest and that some form of economic control over
milk is necessary in order to protect the public health and wel-
fare; and that due to the manner in which milk is marketed, the
farmer actually bears the risk of loss while having no control
over the selling practices engaged in by the retailer.60 Whether
these statements will persuade the court to reverse its position
remains to be seen. Outside of any constitutional considerations,
the policy underlying the court's position can be found in the
following statement made after drawing the analogy of milk
production to meat production, growing and distributing grain
and other food stuffs:0"
It has never been suggested in this state that the economic
security of those engaged in them may be assured by legis-
lative or bureautic price-fixing.
2
It seems the court fears that if it opens the door to price fixing
in the milk industry, that the general food industries of the state
will clamor for a similar protection and thus create "socialized
eating."
VII. "TA=iG" or PRwVATE PRo rm
In Kline v. City of Columbia,63 the plaintiff's property was
damaged as a result of an explosion caused when a gas line was
ripped open while the defendant was engaged in widening a
street. One of the issues04 raised by the city in its demurrer was
whether or not a cause of action was stated under the constitu-
60. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 2847, 2848 (No. 1165, 1966).
61. Gwynette v. Myers, 237 S.C. 17, 30, 115 S.E2d 673, 679 (1960).
62. Id. at 30, 115 S.E.2d at 680.
63. 155 S.E.2d 597 (S.C. 1967).
64. As to the issue of whether a cause of action had been stated under the
statute, S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-70 (1962) and as to the asserted misjoinder of
actions, see Practice and Procedure in this survey.
[Vol. 19
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tion.05 The city relied on Collins-v. City of Greenvile"6 wherein
the act complained of was the alleged negligence of a city em-
ployee in unclogging a sewer line which resulted in sewage being
backed onto plaintiff's premises. Recovery was denied in the
Collins case. The court distinguished this latter case from Kline
on the ground that in Kline the city was engaged:
[Iln the affirmative, aggressive, and positive act of improv-
ing and widening a public street for public use. It was
engaged in the exercise of a power ordinarily, though not
necessarily, exercised under the power of eminent domain.
In the Collins case the city was not engaged in any such
aggressive and positive act.67
Whether or not this distinction is valid becomes questionable
upon a further examination of the court's opinion in the line
case. The following statement is made, "[tihis court has pre-
viously adopted and adhered to the broadest possible view of
what is a taking and has construed the least actual 'damage' to
be a 'taking.' ,168 Within this spirit, the court has allowed recov-
ery where dangerous fumes were created by the improper main-
tenance of a city slaughter house69 and for disagreeable odors
emanating from an incinerator installed by the city.70 It is hard
to see the difference between the latter cases and the present
case and the Collins case. The court may have been influenced
by the continuing nature of the fumes and odors as opposed to
the temporary nature of the standing sewage in Collins. How-
ever, the damage in the Kline case was not any more permanent
than in Collins, just more extensive. When the court spoke of
the city's widening the street as being akin to eminent domain,
did it intimate that had the city merely been repai~ing the street
and caused the explosion recovery would have been denied?
Such an implication is doubtful.
The real reason for the Kline decision can be found in Collins,
wherein the court, discussing this constitutional provision stated,
"It was never intended to furnish a cause of action for every
65. S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 17 reads: "Private property shall not be taken for
private use without the consent of the owner, nor for public use without just
compensation being made therefor."
66. 233 S.C. 506, 105 S.E.2d 704 (1958).
67. Kline v. City of Columbia, 155 S.E2d 597, 599 (S.C. 1967).
68. Id.
69. Derrick v. City of Columbia, 122 S.C. 29, 114 S.E. 857 (1922).
70. Kneece v. City of Columbia, 128 S.C. 375, 123 S.E. 100 (1923).
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error of judgment committed or wrongful act perpetrated by a
town council." 71 It seems the court feels that as a practical
matter a line has to be drawn somewhere in these cases and the
question thus becomes one of degree.
VIII. CEMINAL LAW
The defendant in State V. SwiltingU2 sought reversal of a
death sentence received in his second trial, after the first con-
viction was overturned. Among the grounds relied upon by the
defendant" were prejudicial news comments and failure to
sequester the jury. After discussing the news accounts the court
stated:
The record contains no affirmative showing of prejudice to
the defendant from the newspaper publicity during the
trial. It is not shown that any juror actually read the news
articles in question. Assuming however that the jurors
probably read the newspapers, there is a total absence of any
showing of actual prejudice to the defendant therefrom.
The newspaper articles were not such as to automatically
preclude a fair trial and, under the circumstances, prejudice
will not be presumed.7
4
The court, without actually saying so, seems to have recog-
nized that there must be a balance obtained between the right
of a free press and the right to a fair trial. In this case, the
court struck this balance effectively. If the court had ruled in
favor of the defendant in this case, it would have proven very
difficult to report on any criminal trial in the state. Conse-
quently, there would have been a trend in the direction of return-
ing to the secret hearings of the Star Chamber. It was, after all,
the intention of the framers of the first amendment to insure that
such secrecy would not occur when they included freedom of the
press in the first amendment.
As to whether defendant was prejudiced by the fact that the
jurors were not sequestered the court ruled that this is a matter,
"left to the sound discretion of the trial judge . . . [and] the
71. Collins v. City of Greenville, 233 S.C. 506, 511, 105 S.E.2d 704, 707
(1958). Ed. note. An out of court settlement has been reached in this case.
72. 155 S.E.2d 607 (S.C. 1967).
73. For further consideration of this case see the Criminal Law and Proce-
dure section of this survey.
74. 155 S.E.2d 607, 612 (S.C. 1967).
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action thereabout will not be upset except upon a clear showing
of abuse of such discretion." 75 The court further stated:
In the absence of a showing of prejudice, "we must assume
that each and every member of the jury sought honestly
and impartially, under the law, to discharge his duty, and
that he observed the oath required of a juror."
76
The court merely followed the general rule that the burden of
establishing prejudice rests upon the defendant in cases such as
this and that it is not the state which must prove that a fair
trial was given but the defendant who must show that it was
denied.
7 7
IX. SPECIAL TAXES
In the case of Newton v. Hanlon 7 8 certain property owners
attacked the constitutionality of a statutory scheme empowering
the St. Amdrews Public Service District in Charleston County
to levy an assessment in the construction of a sewer system. 7 9
The crux of the complaint was that the proposed frontage
assessment was imposed on owners whose property abutted the
proposed sewage collection laterals, but no assessment was made
on owners of properties which were unimproved and were not
platted to be used as commercial or residential subdivisions.
The court upheld the proposed method of assessment stating:
All that is required of [a method of assessments] by consti-
tutional law is that they apportion the burden of assessments
with approximate equality, upon a reasonable basis of classi-
fication, and with due regard to the benefits to the indi-
vidual property owners and the requirements of the public
health, safety or welfare.8 0
In the case of Stackhouse v. Floyd,"1 the plaintiffs attacked
the validity of a Dillon County constitutional amendment
75. Id. quoting from State v. Williams, 166 S.C. 63, 164 S.E. 415 (1932).
76. 155 S.E.2d 607, 612-13 (S.C. 1967).
77. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333, 352 (1966) (dictum).
78. 248 S.C. 251, 149 S.E2d 606 (1966).
79. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 718 (No. 397, 1965) is a general statute em-
powering all special purpose districts exercising power to construct and operate
sewer facilities. LIV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 1064 (No. 535, 1965) gives the
St. Andrews Commission its authority to act.
80. Newton v. Hanlon, 248 S.C. 251, 264, 149 S.E.2d 606, 613 (1966).
81. 248 S.C. 183, 149 S.E.2d 437 (1966).
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authorizing the issuance of school bonds. Their contentions were
based on two grounds. First, they asserted that the question as
proposed and ratified by the legislature differed materially
from that submitted to the voters and hence the amendment
had not been validly adopted in accordance with article XVI
of the South Carolina Constitution. Secondly, they contended
that the election in regard to the amendment was improper in
that the proposed amendment was not conspicuously posted at
each voting precinct. The proposed amendment, and that voted
upon by the General Assembly read:
Provided that Dillon County may incur bonded indebted-
ness for school purposes in an amount not exceeding fifteen
percent of the assessed value of all taxable property in the
county, and such indebtedness shall not be considered in
determining the aggregate debt limitation imposed by this
section.
2
The amendment submitted to the voters read:
To permit Dillon County to incur bonded indebtedness for
school purposes in an amount not exceeding fifteen percent
of the assessed value of all taxable property within the
County, and to excude suck indebtedness from limitation
of aggregate indebtedness upon territory in the County.83
The court dispensed with the language difference by ruling that
the same meaning was conveyed by both. The court stated that
the amendment did meet the requirements of article XVI of the
South Carolina Constitution and became a part thereof on Feb-
ruary 10, 1965. In further commenting on the alleged language
difference the court concluded:
"[lit is sufficient that [the form submitted to the voters]
describe the amendment plainly, fairly, and in such words
that the average voter may understand its character and
purpose." The question submitted here meets these require-
ments.
8 4
As to plaintiffs' contention that failure to post the proposed
amendment was a fatal irregularity as to compliance with the
election laws, 85 the court stated:
82. Id. at 191-192, 159 S.E.2d at 442.
83. Id. at 192, 149 SXE2d at 442 (emphasis added).
84. Id. at 193, 149 S.E2d at 443 (citations omitted).
85. S.C. CODE A1'x. § 23-321 (1962).
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It is the ballot, not the posted notice, with which the voter
comes into direct contact. The reasonable assumption is
that he reads the question proposed on the ballot, and that
his vote is cast on consideration of the question as so
worded.86
The court went on to conclude, "[T]he failure to post the amend-
ment. . would have no such vital bearing on the proceedings
as probably prevented 'a free and full expression of the popular
Another objection raised by the plaintiffs was in relation to
the manner in which the General Assembly provided for the
funds to be allocated. In essence, the plan called for the funds
to be distributed in the proportion that the pupil enrollment of
each school district, as of the beginning of the 1964-1965 school
year, bore to the total enrollment in the county. They com-
plained that
inequities in facilities exist among the school districts, that
the needs of the several school districts are not in propor-
tion to the respective per pupil enrollments and that the per
pupil enrollments of the respective school districts are not
in the same proportion as the assessed values of the respec-
tive school districts.88
The court answered this challenge by stating that it has long
been a policy in South Carolina to tax the wealth where it is in
order to educate the child where he is. The court concluded:
[TIhe method of apportionment provided by the legislature
is not prohibited by any provision of the State or Federal
Constitution but is on a basis well established in practice in
this State .... 89
X. CommosnioN or JumIES
In Bostick v. out& CaroZina,99 the United States Supreme
Court reversed the petitioner's conviction in a per curiam opinion
citing only Whitus v. Georgia.91 In the latter ease, reversal of
86. Stackhouse v. Floyd, 248 S.C. 183, 194, 149 SE2d 437, 448 (1966).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 199, 149 S2E2d at 446.
89. Id. at 202, 149 S.E2d at 448.
90. 87 S. Ct. 1088 (1967).
91. 385 U.S. 545 (1967).
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a conviction was rendered on the ground that it appeared that
Negroes were systematically excluded from serving on juries.
As a result of the Bostick decision, more Negroes will appear on
both grand and petit juries in the state. In the state decision,
testimony is found in which a conscious discrimination is de-
nied.0 2 If such is the case, rather than a random selection of
jurors, an effort will have to be made to place some Negroes on
the juries in the state.
By a constitutional amendment,93 women may now serve on
juries in the state.
XI. MISCEGENATION
The case of Loving v. Firginia4 declared that state statutory
and constitutional prohibitions on inter-racial marriages were
void for conflict with the federal constitutional. As a result
thereof, Article 3 Section 33 of the South Carolina Constitution
and South Carolina Code Section 20-7 are null and void insofar
as they relate to inter-racial marriages.95
C. TMOTHY SUIMVAN, JR.
92. Bostick v. State, 247 S.C. 22, 28, 145 S.E2d 439, 442 (1965). The fol-
lowing is an example of the questions and answers in the testimony:
Q. Has the Commission to your knowledge ever made a conscious effort
to place at least one Negro on the Grand Jury?
A. No, because we draw them out and we let them hit as they fall. We
don't keep rejecting whites until we get a Negro. We don't keep rejecting
Negroes until we get a white.
93. LV S.C. STATS. AT LARGE 66 (No. 63, 1967) amending S.C. CoNsT. art.
5, § 22.
94. 18 L. Ed. 2d 1010 (1967).
95. A history of miscegenation laws in the United States and a review of the
Loving case up to this decision can be found in 19 S.C.L. REv. 253 (1967).
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